The relationship between Islamism and women in civil society: a look at Turkey and Egypt by Lockhart, Katherine A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
The relationship between Islamism and women in
civil society: a look at Turkey and Egypt
Lockhart, Katherine A.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND 
WOMEN IN CIVIL SOCIETY: 








Thesis Advisor:  Anne Marie Baylouny 
Second Reader: Ryan Gingeras 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND WOMEN IN CIVIL 
SOCIETY: A LOOK AT TURKEY AND EGYPT 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Katherine A. Lockhart 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
In the lead up to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Government emphasized how the military intervention 
would liberate Afghani women from the Taliban, echoing an old colonial discourse that Muslim women need saving. 
This study reviews the effects of Islamism, especially when it influences political decisions, on women. In particular, 
the study focuses on whether there is a correlation between rising Islamism and women in civil society in Turkey and 











14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Political Islam, Women, Women in Egypt, Women in Turkey, education, employment, political 
opportunities 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
91 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND WOMEN IN CIVIL 
SOCIETY: A LOOK AT TURKEY AND EGYPT  
 
 
Katherine A. Lockhart 
Captain, United States Air Force 
B.S., U.S. Air Force Academy, 2006 
M.E., Colorado State University, 2010 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Mohammed Hafez, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iii 




In the lead up to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. government emphasized how 
the military intervention would liberate Afghani women from the Taliban, echoing an old 
colonial discourse that Muslim women need saving. This study reviews the effects of 
Islamism, especially when it influences political decisions, on women. In particular, the 
study focuses on whether there is a correlation between rising Islamism and women in 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION .................................1 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................2 
D. EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ......................................................8 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .....................................................................................9 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................10 
II. WOMEN IN TURKEY: A MIXED RECORD .......................................................11 
A. WESTERN INFLUENCE AND THE TANZIMAT REFORMS ..............11 
B. 1908–1918: SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD ..............................12 
1. Women in Civil Society—Education, Politics, and Employment ..14 
2. Marriage and Family Law Reform ..................................................15 
C. 1923: KEMALISM.........................................................................................16 
1. New Opportunities .............................................................................16 
2. Marriage and Family Law Reform ..................................................18 
D. AFTER KEMAL: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MANDATED 
SECULARISM ...............................................................................................19 
E. RISE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY......................20 
1. Lifting a Secular Ban .........................................................................21 
2. Family Life under the AK Party.......................................................22 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................24 
III. EGYPT: RELIGIOUS FEMINISM AND STRUGGLES WITH 
GOVERNMENTS AND ISLAMISTS .....................................................................27 
A. WOMEN’S ROLES THROUGH INDEPENDENCE ................................27 
1. Early Reformers .................................................................................27 
2. The Nationalist Movement ................................................................29 
3. Politics, Freedom of Expression, and Education.............................30 
4. Capitalism and Society ......................................................................30 
B. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FEMINISM: POST-INDEPENDENCE, 
1952 REVOLUTION, AND PRESIDENT NASSER ..................................31 
1. Competing factions ............................................................................32 
a. The Secular Faction and the EFU .........................................32 
b. The Islamist Faction and the MWA .......................................33 
2. Political Opportunities.......................................................................34 
3. Employment and Education .............................................................35 
4. Societal Pressures and Family Law ..................................................36 
C. PRESIDENTS SADAT AND MUBARAK ..................................................37 
1. Education and Employment .............................................................38 
2. Political Opportunities, Family Law, and Societal Position ..........40 
D. SINCE THE ARAB SPRING IN 2011 .........................................................41 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................43 
 vii 
IV. IMPORTANCE OF ISLAMISM AND A WOMAN’S ROLE: STATISTICS 
AND PUBLIC OPINION ..........................................................................................45 
A. MEASURING ISLAMISM ...........................................................................45 
1. Elections ..............................................................................................45 
2. Public Opinion ....................................................................................48 
B. WOMEN’S ROLE IN CIVIL SOCIETY ....................................................50 
1. Political Opportunity and Parliamentary Representation .............50 
2. Education: Literacy and Enrollment ...............................................52 
3. Women in the Workforce ..................................................................55 
4. What About the Veil? ........................................................................58 
C. CORRELATION VERSUS CAUSATION .................................................59 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................63 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................65 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................69 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Turkish Elections—Islamist Percentage ..........................................................46 
Figure 2. Egyptian Elections—Islamists Percentage ......................................................47 
Figure 3. Egyptian Views of the Muslim Brotherhood ...................................................48 
Figure 4. Importance of Religion in Turkey....................................................................49 
Figure 5. Importance of Religion in Egypt......................................................................49 
Figure 6. Women in Parliament ......................................................................................51 
Figure 7. Literacy Rates ..................................................................................................53 
Figure 8. Educational Enrollment—Turkey ....................................................................53 
Figure 9. Educational Enrollment—Egypt ......................................................................54 
Figure 10. Female Labor Percentages—Turkey................................................................57 
Figure 11. Unemployment—Turkey .................................................................................57 
Figure 12. Unemployment—Egypt ...................................................................................58 
Figure 13. Turkey—Islamist Political Gains versus Women’s Opportunities ..................60 
Figure 14. Egypt—Islamist Political Gains versus Women’s Opportunities ....................60 
Figure 15. Other Factors—Access to Water .....................................................................62 
Figure 16. Other Factors—Cell Phone and Internet Usage ...............................................62 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Turkish Opinion on the Role of Islam in Politics ............................................47 
Table 2. Egyptian Opinion on the Role of the Koran in Law ........................................50 
Table 3. Opinion—Gender and Political Leadership .....................................................51 
Table 4. Opinion—Gender and Access to Jobs .............................................................56 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Anne Marie Baylouny, for her 
guidance and patience. She initially motivated me to research social movements and the 
Islamic feminism movement. Her inputs in class and on my writing were invaluable.  
I would also like to thank Professor Ryan Gingeras for his vital help in starting 
the research process, especially in regard to Turkey. I would like to thank the entire NSA 
department for opening my eyes to the complexities of the Middle East. 
To all my friends in Monterey: Thank you for making this duty assignment so 
fantastic. Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to my friend Captain Duila Turner 
for starting a thesis support Facebook page. Having a network that shared information 
and offered support was an immense help in getting this project completed. 
 
 xiii 





A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
On November 17, 2001, First Lady Laura Bush gave a radio address describing 
how the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan was liberating Afghani women.1 She hit on a 
common Western fear: Islamic radicals want to expand their ideology to the rest of the 
world.2 Western discourse often focuses on the narrative of the oppressed Muslim 
woman and frequently claims that outward expressions of Islam, such as veiling, are 
symbolic of this oppression.  
The rise in popularity of moderate Islamist political parties in many countries has 
reignited this concern for women. The question becomes: How has the rise of Islamism 
affected the role of women in civil society? The position of women in the public and 
private spheres has a deep connection to culture and nationalism in the Middle East, 
especially in countries like Turkey and Egypt that have rich pre-Islamic histories and 
recent secular pasts. As the popularity of Islamic parties increases and societies turn more 
overtly religious, will this cause women’s potential to expand their realm of rights to 
increase or decrease? It is possible that an Islamic frame will enable women to gain more 
rights, or the opposite could be true and rising Islamism to decrease women’s rights. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Understanding the role of women in civil society in the Middle East has important 
implications for the West. From a policy standpoint, assumptions made by Western 
leaders concerning Muslim women can be disadvantageous. By imposing Western views 
on what women’s liberation should look like, the West narrows the possibilities for 
Muslim women and may be discouraging them from publicly discussing their own 
futures.  
1 Lila abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 





                                                 
By focusing on the two case studies of Egypt and Turkey, this study’s goal is to 
explore the historic role of women in these societies and what effect Western intervention 
has had on women in the past. Furthermore, this study will review how the growth of 
Islamism can affect the role of women in society.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
What if the Western idea of what’s best for Muslim women is detrimental? 
Academic literature seems to contradict Western public perception of the role of women 
in Muslim society, and research shows that some oppressive practices in Islamic societies 
have origins outside of Islam, others are reactions to colonialism, and yet others can be 
interpreted as a form of resistance to outside cultures.3 While Western thought has 
focused on outward appearance, some Muslim women embrace Islam and use it as a 
frame to advance their societal positions.4  
Western policy has focused on the plight of the Muslim woman. Policy makers 
point to certain aspects of Islam, such as the fact that inequality is legally accepted. 
Women and minorities are defined as different, and as such they have different rights. 
While men from other religions can convert, women cannot change the essence of what 
makes them different and will always be legally categorized differently than Muslim 
men.5 Although there is oppression of women in many Muslim countries, the narrative of 
intervention to liberate women is used to justify military operations undertaken for other 
reasons. Furthermore, women are oppressed in a majority of countries in the developing 
world. George and Laura Bush both referenced the plight of Afghani women in 
statements prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.6  Somewhat ironically, 
3 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” in Women, Islam, & the State, ed. by Deniz Kandiyoti 
(Philadelphia: Temple University, 1991), 13-7; Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: 
Yale University, 1992), 235-42; Maria Holt and Haifaa Jawad, Women, Islam, and Resistance in the Arab 
World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013), 2-4; Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 784. 
4 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 788; Smeeta Mishra, “‘Saving’ Muslim Women and Fighting 
Muslim men: Analysis of representations in the New York Times,” Global Media Journal 6, no. 19 (Fall 
2007): 2, http://lass.purduecal.edu/cca/gmj/fa07/gmj-fa07-mishra.htm; Ahmed, Women and Gender, 239; 
Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” 18. 
5 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 7. 
6 Mishra, “‘Saving,’” 2, 4; Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 784.   
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“President George W. Bush called for the ‘liberation’ of women in Afghanistan while 
American forces occupied their territory.”7 Laura Bush stated that American soldiers 
would free Afghani women from their oppressive homes and equated the war on terror to 
a battle to further women’s rights.8  
Emphasizing Muslim women as victims is not a new discourse for the West. As 
Margot Badran states, colonists “used the trope of the ‘oppressed Muslim woman,’ a set 
piece in Orientalist discourse, displaying a feigned concern for ‘her’ plight, in order to 
justify colonial and neo-colonial incursions into Muslim societies, or simply to make a 
show of arrogant superiority.”9 The concern for women also can focus on superficial 
issues; prior to the 2001 invasion, the West defined a liberated Afghani woman as one 
that could buy cosmetics and popular clothing.10 This superficial concern for women’s 
consumer consumption ignores the fact that Muslim women face complex challenges and 
further widens the gender divide.11 Additionally, the narrative illustrates an unspoken 
belief that Islam is inferior to Western political and ideological thought.12 In order to 
believe that Muslims need saving, one must assume that Islam in itself is detrimental to 
women and that Western culture is inherently more beneficial to women.13  
Some of the practices the West points to as oppressive in Muslim societies have 
roots in government policies, socioeconomic symbols, and pre-Islamic cultural traditions 
instead of in Islam.14 Beth Baron explains how governments that wanted to modernize 
chose not to advance women’s rights or family law, even when these laws were based on 
pre-Islamic traditions, in order to minimize the impact of industrialization and keep their 
7 Mishra, “‘Saving,’” 4. 
8 Mishra, “‘Saving,,’” 2; Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 784.   
9 Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009) 
1.   
10 Mishra, “‘Saving,’” 1. 
11 Ibid., 1, 9. 
12 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 2. 
13 Ibid., 245.   
14 Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” 13-4, 17; Ahmed, Women and Gender, 242.   
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constituency’s anger contained.15 Despite the efforts, modernization profoundly changed 
society, and these changes produced a reactionary backlash based on traditional religious 
and patriarchal ideals.16 Ahmed expands on the belief that state policy can drive 
oppression by theorizing that “the misogynist rhetoric let loose into the social system 
implicitly sanctions male violence toward women and sets up women—rather than the 
corruptions and bankruptcies of the government—as targets of male frustration at poverty 
and powerlessness.”17 
Economic transformation and societal modernization, which the West believes 
will help women, might actually be detrimental to them. As Baron explains, “The 
creation of local machinery to channel development funds which are in principle 
designed to have empowering consequences for women and the increased presence of 
women in the workforce can often be seen to coexist with measures strengthening the 
patriarchal features of the society.”18 Women’s increased presence in the workforce led 
to a fear of job scarcity; the fear of women competing for jobs has existed since the late 
nineteenth century.19 Furthermore, women working conflicted with social status. Some 
progressive families did not take issue with their women gaining an education, but 
viewed working outside the home as a necessity for the lower class.20 Economic class 
structures and expectations play into women’s outward appearance as well. The veil and 
other types of covering are signs not only of piety, but also of social standing. Women 
choose when and how to cover themselves depending on the situation.21 
The role of women in Islamic societies is shaped further by imperialism; the 
challenges they face cannot be fully understood without looking at women’s symbolic 
role during colonialism. Colonists “used the argument that the cultures of the colonized 
15 Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” 13, 17. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 242. 
18 Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” 16-7. 
19 Juan Ricardo Cole, “Feminism, Class, and Islam in Turn of the Century Egypt,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 4 (November 1981): 391, JSTOR (162906).   
20 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 190. 
21 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 786.   
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peoples degraded women in order to legitimize Western domination and justify colonial 
policies of actively trying to subvert the cultures and religions of the colonized 
peoples.”22 This feigned concern was limited in scope; for example, English authorities 
in Egypt opposed veiling but did not support education or suffrage for women.23 During 
colonial times, feminists argued that women had to abandon their native culture in order 
to modernize and gain rights; however, this concept was limited to Islamic women—in 
comparison, no one told Victorian English women to abandon their dress and culture 
during their feminist movement.24 The impacts of colonialism still persist; Islamist 
groups use women as symbols due to the colonial powers’ use of women to illustrate the 
perceived shortcomings of Islamic culture.25 
Starting with early twentieth century nationalist movements, women found 
themselves more in the public sphere. Their role, however, was sometimes limited to 
being symbols of cultural nationalism. Nationalists used the position of women as a 
frame in their movements but sometimes excluded women from actual participation. 
Women took this gender segregation as an opportunity to mobilize and form their own 
groups.26 Baron explains, “In spite of the obstacles, women devised their own forms and 
forums for shaping the national polity. In looking at women’s political culture, a dynamic 
picture emerges as women alternated between and among partisan, feminist, Islamist, 
social, and other politics in the name of nation-building.”27  
These nationalist feminists prioritized independence over women’s rights because 
they believed women’s rights would come naturally after independence.28 This, however, 
did not occur, and women’s work in nationalist movements was written out of history and 
22 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 243.   
23 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 784.    
24 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 244.   
25 Ibid., 237. 
26 Beth Baron, Egypt As a Woman: Nationalists, Gender, and Politics (Berkley: University of 
California, 2005), 10, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/reader.action?docID=10082407&ppg=30.   
27 Ibid., 9.   
28 Ibid. 
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women were seen as representations of indigenous culture.29 Margot Badran states that 
“the importance assigned to cultural symbols was different for the two sexes. Men could 
change without losing their cultural authenticity . . . while the burdens of maintaining 
cultural and social continuity were placed on women.”30 The burden of maintaining 
culture excluded women from the political community, and women became the focus of 
policy, not part of the policy creation.31 Nationalists adopted a new family model and 
used the model as a metaphor for the state. In this symbolic family, women were viewed 
as the “mothers of the nation.”32 Nationalists endorsed the new family model because it 
was seen as integral to the successful adoption of capitalism, and the symbolic woman 
became an educated partner in marriage and a market consumer.33 The place and actions 
of women were seen as a representation of overall modernization but also as a symbol of 
the community’s traditional morals.34 
This symbolic use of women is still used to fight against Western cultural 
expansion. Islamist groups use the frame of resistance against neocolonialism today. 
Some women see accepting traditional patriarchy as a form of resistance against 
outsiders,35 and “the increasingly popular practice of resistance within an Islamic 
framework is enabling some women both to access sources of dignity and empowerment 
and also to adopt more active roles.”36 The veil—a term that encompasses head 
coverings ranging from the hijab, or head scarf, to the full face-covering burqa—has 
become many things: an embracement of indigenous culture that colonialism changed 
29 Baron, Egypt As a Woman, 3. 
30 Badran, Feminism in Islam, 26. 
31 Nadje Al-Ali, Secularism, Gender, and the State: The Egyptian Women’s Movement (New York: 
Cambridge University, 2000), 45. 
32 Holt and Jawad, Women, Islam, and Resistance, 4.   
33 Baron, Egypt As a Woman, 5-6.   
34 Holt and Jawad, Women, Islam, and Resistance, 14-5. 
35 Ibid., 5. 
36 Holt and Jawad, Women, Islam, and Resistance, 4.   
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with imposed dress standards, a form of resistance against neocolonialism, and a rejection 
of further Western cultural encroachment.37  
Research has shown that instead of feeling oppressed by their religion, some 
women see Islam as an answer to how to rectify their lack of rights. As Leila Ahmed 
states, “But for the lay Muslim it is not [the] legalistic voice but rather the ethical, 
egalitarian voice of Islam that speaks most clearly and insistently. It is because Muslim 
women hear this egalitarian voice that they often declare (generally to the astonishment 
of non-Muslims) that Islam is nonsexist.”38 Islam, when it first was founded, was 
revolutionary for its times. In some ways, it brought gender relations in the Arab 
peninsula in line with surrounding communities, and in other ways, Islam afforded 
women more rights than other women in the Middle East.39 Furthermore, practices 
deemed Islamic might be gender practices from surrounding communities that were 
assimilated into the Islamic community; for example, the practices of veiling and gender 
segregation were widespread throughout the Middle East and Mediterranean region.40 
There are women in the Middle East drawn to Islamist political parties because of 
the parties’ principles, morals, and resistance to Western cultural expansion. As Maria 
Holt and Haifaa Jawad explain, “It seems likely that some modern Islamist groups in the 
Arab world are engaging with modernity in order to create a more inclusive society. If 
women have felt left out of ‘nation making,’ they may be better able to relate to the 
Islamist grand narrative of resistance.”41 Islamist groups support an enhanced position 
for women within an Islamic framework. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
supported opportunities for women in education and employment. The Brotherhood 
supported education as a way for women to be better wives, and they supported women 
in any job as long as the women upheld moral standards.42  
37 Badran, Feminism in Islam, 145; Ahmed, Women and Gender, 235. 
38 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 239.   
39 Ibid., 4. 
40 Ibid., 5.   
41 Holt and Jawad, Women, Islam, and Resistance, 16.    
42 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 194.   
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This respect for Islamic principles and the concept of itjihad, or independent 
study of Islamic scriptures,43 have inspired some women to go back to the sacred texts to 
make the case that oppressive practices in many Islamic societies are not in fact 
Islamic.44 Instead of looking toward the West as an example on how to gain rights, they 
look to feminist movements in other Muslim countries, like Iran.45 Freda Hussain 
supports the use of Islam by women, she states “that change in the ‘role of Muslim 
women must be brought about, by the elimination of feudal Islam through Islam . . . The 
Quranic text must be related to the present context and used to liberate women from male 
domination.’”46 Furthermore, outward symbols of personal piety, such as Islamic dress, 
can afford women more freedom. Hanna Papnek states that the burqa in Pakistan is a 
form of “portable seclusion.” 47 The garment gives women the ability to move freely 
through the public sphere without sacrificing their morality.48 Furthermore, veiling 
enables women to be less passive in the public sphere than their secular counterparts 
because it established the women’s religious bona fides.49  
By focusing on the old colonial discourse of liberating Muslim women, Western 
leaders are in fact damaging the position of these women by igniting anti-Western 
sentiment which increases the controls on women in order to maintain traditional culture. 
Contrary to Western perception, Islam might enable women to expand their role in civil 
society through an Islamic framework.  
D. EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Historically, the place of women in civil society has been inextricably linked to 
definitions of nationalism and culture in Turkey and Egypt. Since political Islam is 
becoming part of the national identity in these countries, women might have more 
43 Holt and Jawad, Women, Islam, and Resistance, 13. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 788.   
46 Mishra, “‘Saving,’” 19. 
47 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women,” 785. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” 18.   
 8 
                                                 
success advancing their place in civil society through an Islamic framework. Women 
have played an integral part in Islam since its founding, so allowing and encouraging 
women to find their rights through the framework of Islam could be more effective than 
Western imposed ideas of feminism. Allowing Islam and faith into the public sphere 
might actually allow women greater freedoms outside of their home. Furthermore, 
Islamic parties tend to rely on women as a key demographic to get elected, and organic 
demands from members and constituents might influence party platforms. 
This study will research the existence of a relationship between the rise of 
Islamism and the role of women. The rise of Islamism will be measured through the 
electoral popularity of Islamic political parties, as well as through various studies on 
public opinions. The role of women will be measured by educational opportunities, 
participation in government, employment opportunities, and status under family law. 
Current rhetoric by Islamist leaders will be reviewed to ascertain whether leaders favor 
expanded roles for women. Hypotheses include: 
• H1: There is no correlation between Islamist politics and opportunities for 
women. The issue of a woman’s place in society is tied to other factors 
such as cultural nationalism and Western imperialism, preventing a direct 
correlation. 
• H2: The rise in popularity of Islamist politics and Islamic practices in 
Turkey and Egypt led to more opportunities in education and public 
employment for women. 
• H3: The rise of political Islam resulted in fewer opportunities for women.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This paper focuses on two case study countries: Egypt and Turkey. This study 
utilizes Egypt and Turkey due to their historical leadership in the greater Middle East in 
terms of public policy. Both countries have rich pre-Islamic histories and had secular 
governments following colonial independence. Furthermore, both countries have a long 
history of Islamist political movements that have had success in recent years. Given the 
changing environment in Egypt, this study will touch on current issues facing Egyptian 
women, but focuses primarily on the role and rights of women before the 2013 military 
takeover. 
 9 
This thesis reviews the historic role women played in Egypt and Turkey and the 
significance of their role as cultural symbols. This research was completed by a review of 
current scholarship on the subject of women and will utilize mostly secondary sources. 
The review of women’s place in regards to modern advances for women proceeds 
through a review of the statistical information on women in government, public opinion 
polls, educational enrollment, and labor statistics. The goal of analysis was to see if there 
is a correlation between rising Islamism and greater rights for women. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis addresses how the role of women in civil society is currently changing 
in Turkey and Egypt. Chapter II focuses on Turkey. Starting in the late Ottoman period 
and ending with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the chapter 
reviews how leaders used the position of women to further their own agendas. The 
chapter also reviews how a woman’s political, educational, and employment status 
changed depending on which government was in power. Chapter III focuses on Egypt. 
The early twentieth century’s Islamic feminist movement is discussed, as well as how the 
impact of authoritarian governments affected political freedoms and economic 
opportunities for women. In Chapter IV, this study reviews primary data for Egypt and 
Turkey over the last 30 years. It illustrates women’s roles in civil society based on 
political participation, educational enrollment, and overall employment. The study 
reviews Islamist political position and looks for a correlation between Islamism and the 
role of women. Chapter IV also touches on other possible factors that relate to women’s 
position in society. Chapter V concludes the study with a discussion of possible 




II. WOMEN IN TURKEY: A MIXED RECORD 
The role of women in Turkish society is complex. Since the late Ottoman period, 
the role of women in civil society has been used as a symbol by ruling elites to maintain 
their power. Ruling governments—whether Islamist or secular—have appealed to both 
reformers and conservatives by increasing educational, employment, and political 
opportunities for women while maintaining or making slow changes to family laws. 
A. WESTERN INFLUENCE AND THE TANZIMAT REFORMS 
Growing from a reaction to Western reforms, the first movement to change the 
status of women in the Ottoman Empire came from the Young Ottomans. Although 
traditional and Islamic, the Young Ottomans saw benefits to increasing educational and 
employment opportunities for women. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, increased interaction with the West 
brought with it societal change. Due to international pressures, the Ottomans enacted a 
series of reforms, called Tanzimat, aimed at increasing modernization and protecting 
minorities. The Tanzimat reforms appeased the Western powers at the expense of parts of 
society that once had better standing—such as artisans and craftsmen—leading to “deep 
cleavages in Ottoman society.”50 Western influence led to a complex situation for 
women; “the influence of the West was… mediated through multiple and varying levels 
of ‘othering’ that must have had an impact on women’s positionality, daily lives, and 
apprehensions of the ‘modern.’”51  Attacks on cultural symbols, such as the headscarf or 
veil, led to a rise in defense of its wear. Although not all women wore the scarf for 
religious reasons, head coverings were common and not restricted to just Muslims.52 The 
50 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward Questions on Women and Modernity in Turkey,” in Remaking 
Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East, ed. by Lila abu-Lughod (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University, 1998,) 273. 
51 Ibid., 275. 
52 Emelie A. Olson, “Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: ‘The Headscarf 
Dispute,’”  Anthropological Quarterly 58, no. 4 (1985): 164, JSTOR (3318146). 
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west, however, saw veiling as a representation of Ottoman backwardness.  Therefore, the 
Ottomans started to equate the scarf to a cultural symbol that needed to be defended.53 
Seen by many in Turkey as capitulations to the Western powers, the Tanzimat 
reforms gave rise to the Young Ottoman movement. The Young Ottomans blended 
Western ideas, such as liberalism, with Islam.54 Although the Tanzimat reforms were 
pushed by European empires, the Young Ottomans felt that the reforms excessively 
increased the Ottoman government’s power and that the government had unacceptably 
embraced secularism.55  The Young Ottomans reacted to the Tanzimat reforms by 
rejecting some Western concepts but accepting and embracing others: they embraced 
nationalism and attempted Islamize it.56 The rise of the Young Ottomans led to a 
dichotomy for women. While on one hand the traditionalists and “male polemicists on 
questions relating to women and the family used the condition of women to express 
deeper anxieties concerning the cultural integrity of the Ottoman/Muslim polity in the 
face of Western influence,”57 the Young Ottomans can be seen as pioneers of women’s 
reform.58 They called to reform the marriage system, offered women greater educational 
opportunities, and believed that certain reforms to women’s rights were necessary steps 
towards modernization, even from an Islamic perspective.59 
B. 1908–1918: SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD 
Despite cultural debates on the role of women, women were actively recruited 
into the labor field as the Empire attempted to fight consecutive wars and needed 
manpower during the Second Constitutional Period from 1908 to 1918. During this time 
two different narratives about Ottoman culture, and within these narratives two different 
53 Imtiaz Ahmad, “Why Is the Veil Such a Contentious Issue?” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 
49 (2006): 5038, JSTOR (4418998). 
54 Deniz Kandiyoti, “End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism and Women in Turkey,” in Women, Islam & 
the State, ed. by Deniz Kandiyoti, (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1991), 25. 
55 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 272-3. 
56 Ibid., 273. 
57 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 23. 
58 Ibid., 25. 
59 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 25; Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 273. 
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conceptions on the place of women, emerged—the Western and Islamist models.  The 
Western model was that Western rationalism was a necessary complement to modern 
technology; within this ideology, the position of Ottoman women was viewed as an 
indication of Ottoman backwardness.60 Turkish nationalism added to this frame; women 
were seen as being elevated in pre-Islamic Turkey. The low place of women in Ottoman 
society was seen as a result of Arab and Persian cultural influence.61 Ziya Gökalp, a 
Turkish writer, advocated for ‘Moral Turkism’—a return to pre-Islamic Turkish tradition 
of monogamous, equal, democratic marriage. He felt that although Islam improved the 
lives of Arabian women when it started, the nuclear family was the best model for the 
future and had cultural routes in Turkish history.62 In contrast, the Islamist frame saw 
Western modernization as inevitable but Western culture and family customs as 
unallowable.63 This competing look at culture resulted in a social situation in which 
women were seen as the ultimate symbols of indigenous culture. Denis Kandiyoti 
summarizes, “As will become clearer in the discussion of ideological currents during the 
Second Constitutional period . . . later debates on women would both reveal and create 
bitter cleavages among the Ottoman elite itself, when the condition of women became 
more self-consciously identified as the touchstone of Ottoman cultural ‘integrity or 
‘backwardness’ as the case might be.”64  The role of women in Ottoman society was 
further complicated by socio-economic status. Gender roles varied greatly depending on 
class.65 Furthermore, women’s first interactions with modernization took forms 
depending on status: upper-class women were exposed to Western culture through their 
tutors, religious minorities went to European mission schools, and Turkish Muslim 
women, who embraced Western ideas of liberalism, declared that a woman being in the 
public sphere was in line with Islamic and Turkish customs.66 
60 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 33. 
61 Ibid., 40-1. 
62 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 279; Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 34-5. 
63 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 32. 
64 Ibid., 26. 
65 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 282. 
66 Ibid., 277. 
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1. Women in Civil Society—Education, Politics, and Employment 
The Second Constitutional period led to increased opportunities for women in the 
political, economic, and educational realms. The role of Islam in society complicated 
women’s situations. While some used Islam as a platform for change, others reacted to 
the vast societal changes by calling for increased traditionalism. 
Women became active in publishing articles, protesting for more rights, and 
supporting the state. One woman, Fatma Aliye Hanim, contributed to a women’s 
magazine that focused on providing advice on the family and Islam.67 After World War I, 
women took an active role in protests against the post-war occupation. Furthermore, 
women set up resistance organizations parallel to the occupation resistance movement 
run by men.68 
Economically, changes prior to World War I were designed to increase the size of 
the local labor force and were targeted at women. Schools for midwives and teachers 
opened in the mid-nineteenth century.69 Educational opportunities further increased for 
women, including mandatory primary school in 1913.70 Increased vocational and 
business education opportunities led to more women going into business during the war 
years.71 Even more women were needed in the labor force during the Balkan Wars and 
World War I since the men were on the front lines.72 Kandiyoti states that “it was during 
World War I that the massive loss of male labour to the front created a demand for 
women’s labour. The growth of female employment did not remain confined to white-
collar jobs in post offices, banks, municipal services and hospitals but involved attempts 
at wider mobilization throughout the Anatolian provinces.”73 Furthermore, the Red 
67 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 27. 
68 Ibid., 37. 
69 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 28. 
70 Erik Jan Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), Kindle edition, 122. 
71 Ibid., 30. 
72 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 274. 
73 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 30. 
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Crescent Society trained women to be nurses, and they took an active role treating 
battlefield injuries.74 
The movement of women into the public sphere had unintended consequences. 
The loss of the protection offered by veiling and seclusion, coupled with rise in amorous 
relationships instead of family prearrangements, resulted in men believing they had freer 
access to women. Since the connection of a woman’s chastity to her family’s honor did 
not dissipate, women had to be extremely careful to guard their purity against men’s new 
expectations.75 This created a challenge for women, as they “were thrust upon a public 
world of men whose habits of heterosocial interaction were restricted and shallow. This 
created unprecedented problems of identity management for women who had to devise 
new sets of signals and codes in order to function in the public realm without 
compromising their respectability.”76  
2. Marriage and Family Law Reform 
While women’s place and opportunities in civil society increased in the realms of 
education and employment during the Second Constitutional Period, they struggled to see 
concrete changes to family law. Change came slowly, with the first hurdle being women 
attending entertainment and political events.77 Ottoman attempts at modernization did not 
include family law until 1917.78 Central to family law reform was the debate on the ideal 
Ottoman family. This debate was a metaphor for a greater discussion about society and 
government. The Ottoman patriarch could be seen as a symbol equivalent to the absolute 
power of the sultan and the upper class. The wish to move toward a more democratic 
nuclear family had parallels to the wish to move toward democracy.79 The push for the 
nuclear family was tied to the perceived scientifically ideal living situation of the time. 
The Ottomans were interested in healthy, procreative families due to demographic issues 
74 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 30. 
75 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 282. 
76 Ibid., 283. 
77 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 122. 
78 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 27. 
79 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 278. 
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they faced after they lost the Balkan territories.80 World War I also brought changes to 
Ottoman family life. The government enacted mandatory labor laws that enabled 
provincial women to work in fields previously closed to them. Marriage became 
mandatory for both sexes, and having children was financially rewarded by the 
government.81 Kandiyoti summarizes the state of gender during this period: “it was not 
merely the material aspects of procreation that came under scrutiny but the psychological 
and emotional tone of family life itself … what was at stake was not just the remaking of 
women but the wholesale refashioning of gender and gender relations.”82  
C. 1923: KEMALISM 
After almost 10 continuous years of war, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed on 
October 29, 1923, with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as the first president.83 Ataturk’s 
elevation ushered in a program of societal transformation.  Daily life for women changed 
dramatically, and “early reforms modeled on Western ideals empowered women in the 
public sphere—especially in such areas as education, political enfranchisement, and 
dress—but left the private sphere (and most of Turkey’s rural population) untouched.”84 
This resulted in a situation where women were not individually empowered.85  
1. New Opportunities 
Kemalism represented an “ideological break” from the old system under the 
Ottomans; new realities included women being given the status of citizens in the new 
republic, a wave of Turkish nationalism, and an embrace of secularism,.86 One particular 
change was a push to end the wear of traditional dress. Ataturk saw head covering as an 
80 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 280-1. 
81 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 30-1. 
82 Kandiyoti, “Some Awkward,” 281. 
83 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 106, 166. 
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un-Turkish tradition imported from Ottoman Arab, Persian, and Byzantine societies. Due 
to this, one of the secular reforms enacted was the 1925 Hat Law that outlawed the fez, or 
traditional male Ottoman hat. This law did not comment on women’s dress; however, 
women were expected to change due to social pressure.87 As Ataturk stated, “Our women 
are sensitive and as intelligent as we are . . . Let them show their faces to the world and 
allow them to observe the world carefully. We have nothing to fear.”88 The expectation 
of the new Turkish woman was that she would take advantage of all her new rights: 
education, access to politics, and unveiling.89 In terms of politics, women were granted 
the right to vote and the ability to hold office on December 5, 1934.90  
Women took advantage of other increased opportunities to participate in civil 
society. First, upper class women began attending public events. Ataturk included his 
wife and adopted daughters in official events, and photographs of events and ceremonies 
showed women actively participating. This change in public perception of acceptable 
behavior led to a generation of women becoming politically active.91 The changes made 
during the Kemalist era resulted in greater participation of women in public life; 
however, some of these changes were not long-lasting. Women had the highest number 
of representatives in the National Assembly during the First Republic in 1937 when they 
reached four and a half percent of the delegates. The percentage of women declined after 
that year.92 Furthermore, independent political organizations were suppressed or 
inhibited.93 One example of this is the case of the Turkish Women’s Federation (TWF). 
Founded in 1924, the TWF hosted the 12th Congress of the International Federation of 
87 Roff Smith, “Why Turkey Lifted Its Ban on the Islamic Headscarf,” National Geographic, October 
11, 2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/10/131011-hijab-ban-turkey-islamic-headscarf-
ataturk/; Olson, “‘Muslim Identity and Secularism,” 164-5. 
88 My Head is Mine: Women in Istanbul, directed by Petrus van der Let and Andrea Simon (Vienna, 
Austria: Arcadia Pictures, 2001), DVD. 
89 Banu Gokariksel and Katharyne Mitchell,”Veiling, Secularism, and the Neoliberal Subject: 
National Narratives and Supranational Desires in Turkey and France,” Global Networks 5, no. 2 (2005): 
156, Wiley Online (10.1111/j.1471-0374.2005.00112.x). 
90 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 177; Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 23. 




                                                 
Women in Istanbul, where international delegates praised Turkey and the leadership of 
Ataturk for granting women’s suffrage. The TWF was disbanded shortly after the 
conference, in 1935. It was determined that with suffrage the group had accomplished its 
goal: women had equal rights.94 One of the reasons for the lack of support for 
independent women’s groups was that the government wanted to keep control of 
women’s issues. As Kandiyoti states, “Women’s emancipation under Kemalism was part 
of a broader political project of nation-building and [secularization] … however, the 
authoritarian nature of the single-party state and its attempt to harness the ‘new woman’ 
to the creation and reproduction of a uniform citizenry aborted the possibility for 
autonomous women’s movements.”95  
2. Marriage and Family Law Reform 
In terms of concrete changes to marriage and family laws, the Kemalist regime 
acted slowly. The first National Assemblies post-occupation did not enact the sweeping 
changes to women’s status that women who participated in the liberation movement 
expected. At the time, changes were seen as too drastic and likely to offend some of the 
ruling party’s constituency.96 This slow movement seemed at odds with women’s 
involvement during the wars. During the “War of National Liberation, peasant women in 
Anatolia… played critical roles which were celebrated and glorified in public monuments 
and patriotic rhetoric alike. Yet the coalition of nationalist forces which united behind 
Mustafa Kemal included men of religion who were going to remain totally inflexible on 
the question of women’s emancipation.”97 After power was consolidated in the hands of 
Ataturk and his Republican People’s Party in 1924,98 the party had the ability to make 
hard changes. The Turkish Civil Code of 1926 resulted in major changes to family law; it 
cut ties with Muslim religious laws, banned polygyny, and gave women equal rights to 
94 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 41; Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 180. 
95 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 43. 
96 Ibid., 38. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 176. 
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divorce.99 This sweeping change can be seen just as much as a movement toward 
secularism as it can be called a victory for women. 
D. AFTER KEMAL: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MANDATED 
SECULARISM 
The political strife and instability that characterized Turkey in between the 
Kemalist era and AK Party’s electoral victory affected women just as it affected all 
Turkish citizens. The period between 1950 and 2002 can be characterized as politically 
unstable.100 After World War II, the Kemalist one-party system that ran the country since 
1923 was forced to democratize due to internal socio-economic pressures and external 
international politics.101 By the 1957 elections, the Democratic Party that had succeeded 
Kemal’s Republican People’s Party, had grown deeply unpopular in urban areas. In order 
to stay in power, they appealed to religious constituents. This pandering resulted in the 
party being labeled as Islamist and anti-secularist.102 The political situation continued to 
deteriorate, and the military staged a coup on May 27, 1960. This coup established a 
pattern; the ruling government would be accused of mismanagement or anti-secularism, 
tensions would rise, and then the military would take over and restore order. Between 
1960 and 2002 there were four military coups.103 
The period before the 1980 coup was characterized by a mass polarization of the 
society, and the coup brought about sweeping changes. Prior to it, there had been a rise in 
Islamic expressions in the public sphere including wearing Islamic dress, reciting Islamic 
poetry, using Arabic, and building mosques.104 Islam was just one side of the escalating 
conflict, and each political group came to be known by a specific type of dress: “the 
conspicuous and constant ‘signing’ of religious and political views through dress and hair 
by extremists on all fronts was seen as both inflaming passions and making the ‘enemy’ 
99 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 22-3. 
100 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 220-332. 
101 Ibid., 206-9. 
102 Ibid., 221, 232. 
103 Ibid., 240-323. 
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on both sides too easily identifiable to snipers and assassins.”105 In response to this tense 
situation, the interim military government enacted laws to clamp down on the rise of 
Islamic dress and influence. One change was a ban on headscarves in the public sphere 
including government offices, hospitals, schools, and universities.106 Headscarves were 
not the only thing banned: the military also outlawed mini-skirts and men’s mustaches.107  
In the 1980s, professional women and academics started to push back against the 
headscarf ban by claiming it infringed on their constitutional rights and limited their 
educational opportunities.108 Throughout the next two decades, there were many protests 
by women who wanted to wear the veil.109 After another military coup in 1997, the 
military told the government to return to secularism and enforce the laws protecting it.110 
Even so, the headscarf issue did not go away. In 1999, Merve Kavakci, a member of the 
Islamic Virtue Party, tried to enter Parliament while wearing a hijab.111 She was not 
allowed to participate in a swearing in ceremony, and her actions contributed to the 2001 
ban of her political party.  Other women chose to become more creative. University 
students wore hats, shawls, and even wigs in order to meet their religious obligations. 
Some veil wearers chose to remove their veil on campuses and in government spaces, but 
saw it as an infringement. As one student put it, “We are forced to adjust to laws like 
this.”112 
E. RISE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY  
The current government, led by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), 
has supporters and detractors concerning its Islamist leanings and programs toward 
105 Olson, “‘Muslim Identity and Secularism,” 163. 
106 Smith, “Why Turkey Lifted Its Ban.” 
107 Olson, “‘Muslim Identity and Secularism,” 163. 
108 Ibid., 161. 
109 Unal Gundogan, “Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological 
Influences,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 7, no. 1 (2003): 9, http://www.gloria-
center.org/meria/2003/03/gundogan.pdf. 
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women. The AK Party came to power after the 2002 parliamentary elections.113 Despite 
many calling the AK Party “Islamist,” the party leadership rejects that claim.114 Instead, 
the AK Party defines itself as “a conservative democratic mass party that situates itself at 
the center of the political spectrum.”115 In its political vision, the AK Party advocates for 
gradual culture change toward their stated moral ideals. They believe that “the 
conservative approach is a pioneering element of the transformation and reform process 
in Turkey.”116 The AK Party has enacted changes and social programs that have resulted 
in it having a strong female constituency. In 2011, it won fifty percent of the popular vote 
and fifty-five percent of the women’s vote.117 Some female activists, however, lament 
that despite new policies encouraging women to focus on motherhood and not on careers, 
many women possibly support the AK Party due to increased financial aid programs.118 
1. Lifting a Secular Ban 
One change that has elicited praise and concern is the lifting of the headscarf ban. 
In the view of the AK Party, the ban prevented religious women from taking full part in 
civil society. Although there has been a strong backlash against attempts to lift the ban on 
the veil in the past, the AK Party and Prime Minister Recep Erdogan have successfully 
led the charge to partially change the laws. Although unsuccessful in 2007, in November 
113 “Turkey 2002 Legislative Election,” Center on Democratic Performance ERA: Election Result 
Archive, Binghamton University: State University of New York, accessed January 19, 2015, 
http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/elections/tur02par.html. 
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2012 the headscarf ban was partially lifted in schools.119 Along with eliminating dress 
code requirements, the AKP allowed students to wear scarves during Koran lessons.120  
Although some secularists reacted with alarm—the headline of the Cumhuriyet 
newspaper was, “This will end with chadors”—others saw the change as a step toward 
liberalization.121 The head of the Democratic Educators’ Union stated, “We will not be 
able to rescue the education system from the perverse consequences of the oppression, 
rituals, dogma and thinking of the ‘cold war’ period until teachers and pupils are 
liberated.”122 The success of this change led to further relaxation of the headscarf ban. In 
2013, it was lifted for those in civil service jobs and government offices. At the time, 
Prime Minister Erdogan stated that the ban had prevented the women who wore it from 
being fully engaged in Turkish society.123 Although secularists claim the AKP is pushing 
to change Turkey into an Islamic society, the AK Party maintains that the changes are 
liberal reforms enacted to embrace freedom of religion. Their view is that the ban 
prevented women from embracing opportunities and that lifting the ban is akin to 
embracing multiculturalism.124 
2. Family Life under the AK Party 
While the AK Party’s work to overturn the headscarf ban has granted 
opportunities to religious women, the Party’s stance on family and women’s programs 
has caused concern for some activists. Hülya Gülbahar, a lawyer and prominent women’s 
rights activist, feels that the AK Party’s policies have progressively worsened for 
women.125 In response to a draft of the 2007 Constitution that lumped women in with the 
119 Salih Bayram, “Reporting Hijab in Turkey: Shifts in the Pro- and Anti-Ban Discourses,” Turkish 
Studies 10, no. 4 (2009): 512, Taylor and Francis (10.1080/14683840903141590); Dan Butler, “Turkey lifts 
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elderly and children, Gülbahar stated, “The prime minister has openly said he does not 
believe in equality between men and women. Previously, there was no questioning of the 
principle of gender equality.”126 While the perception that women need to be protected is 
alarming to some, the AK Party sees its support for the family as something that sets it 
apart.127 The party vision states, “The driving force behind our social policies is to 
protect and support families that are the strength of our community and builders of our 
future.”128 This prioritization of the family unit over a particular group is demonstrated 
by the merger of all social welfare institutions into one ministry—the Ministry of Family 
and Social policies.129 For some, this merger signaled the government taking a stance 
that women’s rights are subordinate to family issues.130  
Even with the changes to how social welfare is run, the AK Party claims that they 
have several initiatives specifically targeted at women. They plan to create parenting 
schools, offer family counseling, provide daycare services for working mothers, and 
support female entrepreneurs with training and financial resources. They link several 
aspects of the social safety net, such as housing and income distribution, to their family 
policies.131 The AKP party platform states, “Improvements shall be made in [women’s] 
social security and working conditions taking into consideration working environment, 
children and family responsibilities of women.”132 The program that categorized the 
work of housewives as labor worthy of social security brought the AK Party both female 
supporters and the ire of women’s rights activists who feel that it encourages women to 
stay home.133   
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The AK Party states that they support non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
targeting women.134 Women’s rights activists, however, are concerned by the rise of new 
NGOs. Local governments are partnering with new NGOs supported by the federal 
government instead of the older more-established ones. The new organizations lack the 
continuity and expertise of the established NGOs.135 The AK Party’s success in 
increasing legal protection to women has been mixed. Penal code changes enacted in 
2005 ensured individual rights, but that law has not been evenly enforced. In practice, 
rights are still seen as communal. Offenses can result in the community punishing an 
individual.136 Furthermore, while the Party’s vision states that they have a zero violence 
policy toward women and details the success the government has had in establishing 
violence prevention centers and shelters,137 abuse against women is still prevalent. Forty-
five percent of women between the ages of 15 and 60 have reported being physically or 
sexually abused.138 One secularist narrative for this discrepancy is that “the rhetoric that 
sees the main mission of women as being motherhood also plays into the rise in violence 
against women.”139  
F. CONCLUSION 
The status of women in civil society has been used by ruling elites to maintain 
power in Turkey since the late Ottoman Empire. As shown by the Young Ottoman 
movement and the AK Party, calls for reform and increased opportunities from women 
can come from Islamist and conservative governments as well as from secular ones. 
Since the Young Ottomans, governments have pushed to increase educational and 
employment opportunities for women. Political opportunities for women have ebbed and 
flowed depending on the overall political situation. These reforms have been pushed as a 
reaction to Western influence, as a wartime necessity, and as a necessary modernizing 
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step. Improving life for women in the private sphere has been more difficult. Facing 
greater opposition from religious authorities, changes to family law have proved 
challenging, even for the secular regime of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The AK Party 
appears to be continuing the trend of increasing educational opportunities while making 
more conservative reforms to family laws. Although seen as backwards steps by some, 
the changes to the headscarf ban and social bureaucracy have positively affected enough 
Turkish women that the AK Party enjoyed the majority of the female vote in the last 
Parliamentary election.140 Overall, the historical position of women in Ottoman and 
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III. EGYPT: RELIGIOUS FEMINISM AND STRUGGLES WITH 
GOVERNMENTS AND ISLAMISTS 
The role of women in civil society in Egypt has vacillated depending on the ruling 
regime’s relationship with Islamist groups. While the role of Islamists has not affected 
women’s access to education, it has negatively affected women in the realm of family 
law and societal pressure. Furthermore, women’s political opportunities and employment 
options have fluctuated depending on the regime’s political and economic policies more 
so than on the role of Islam in society.  
A. WOMEN’S ROLES THROUGH INDEPENDENCE 
At the turn of the twentieth century, increased contact with modernity and the 
changes that capitalism, liberal thought, and colonialism brought to Egypt inspired an 
Islamic feminist movement.141 Early calls for women’s rights gained steam after the 
nationalist movement succeeded in gaining independence in 1923. Similar to Turkey, 
women became more prominent in the public sphere due to their involvement in the 
independence movement, and these same women would later fight for greater education, 
employment, and personal status rights.142 
1. Early Reformers 
Early calls for reform came from men as well as women. Men, due to their 
increased agency, are seen as the key drivers of the feminist movement. During the fight 
for independence, male feminists were the main target of the religious opposition. The 
religious authorities saw the men as being more radical than the women; however, male 
feminism seems to have reached its peak during this time period.143 Even so, the push by 
male activists to allow female education is seen as important.144 Nationalist Egyptian 
141 Badran, Feminism in Islam, 215.   
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writers and politicians saw the education of women as necessary in order for women to 
meet their moral obligation to teach the next generation. In this way, the educated woman 
was a necessity “in the production of cultured young men dedicated to the nationalist 
cause.”145 Furthermore, nationalists argued that the failure to educate women equated to 
failing to uphold Islamic values, and that failure caused European colonization.146   
One key male feminist was Shaikh Muhammed Abduh, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, 
who believed in ending the practices of full face veiling and seclusion, providing greater 
educational opportunities, limiting polygamy, and ending men’s ability to easily initiate a 
divorce.147 Another male feminist that shared many of Shaikh Abduh’s beliefs was 
Qasim Amin, a lawyer and judge who believed the core problem for Egyptian women, 
and Egypt in general, was that women were being denied their Islamic rights, and this 
denial was preventing Egypt from embracing modernization.148 Although looked at as a 
key feminist thinker, the justifications for Amin’s beliefs tended to be based on economic 
efficiency.149  
The Egyptian upper class produced the first female feminists. Margot Badran 
explains, “Feminist discourse fist emerged in the writings of women of privilege and 
education who lived in the secluded world of the urban harem. Women gained new 
exposure through expanded education and widening contacts within the female 
world.”150 One example of an early female leader, Bahithat al Badiya (a pen name 
meaning “Searcher in the Desert”) published essays and speeches in the early twentieth 
century.  In 1911, she sent demands to the Egyptian Congress that would later form the 
basic platform of the Egyptian feminist movement; she demanded that women be granted 
greater education, more access to employment opportunities, and the right to worship in 
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mosques.151 Although men pushed for unveiling, early female activists pushed for 
equality in the public sphere first; as women ventured into public space, the veil would 
protect them from aggressive behavior.152  
2. The Nationalist Movement 
Nationalist leaders embraced women into their ranks in order to amass a greater 
support base, and as a result women had their first opportunity to participate publically in 
a social movement.153 As militants in the nationalist struggle, women learned valuable 
social mobilization skills.154 As a result, “women’s feminism [became] more explicit and 
was increasingly expressed within a nationalist idiom reflecting and fuelling the growing 
nationalist moment in Egypt.”155 The movement brought together women from all social 
classes. Upper class women organized protest participation through the harems, and their 
presence inspired lower class women to come to the streets.156  
The nationalist movement was happy to use the talents of women for its cause; 
however, its leaders never fully embraced the idea of gender equality as a core concept 
for the new nation. They saw the use of women as a way to inspire men to action, but 
they viewed women as symbols of their culture and not necessarily a part of the nation 
they were trying to create.157 Marilyn Booth states, “men’s writings on the woman 
question had to do not so much with the life-conditions of real women as with competing 
nationalist ideologies that presume a nation maintained by a male leadership.”158 
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3. Politics, Freedom of Expression, and Education 
Women did not achieve many gains in political expression during the early 
twentieth century. The political and religious authorities both approached women with a 
patriarchal lens. There was some room for female independent thought and organization, 
but women were alternatively suppressed or encouraged depending on if their view 
matched the government’s view.159  Women, however, did begin to find their voice 
through journalism and salon debates during this time period.160 
The nationalist movement inspired a call for increased education for women. As a 
British colony, Egyptian educational opportunities were limited. The British colonial 
government provided just enough school positions to satisfy their need for qualified civil 
servants, but limited the number of educational opportunities in order to avoid having an 
excess of disaffected intellectuals.161 Due to these limited opportunities, men did not 
want to compete against women.162 Nationalists, however, seized limits on education as a 
core issue and added it to their platform.163 As more educational opportunities became 
available, women had better tools to understand their religion and to question restrictions 
placed on them that were more cultural than Islamic.164  
4. Capitalism and Society 
One negative aspect of modernity was that the massive cultural and economic 
changes it brought inspired some to grasp onto traditional practices, even if these 
practices did not have firm Islamic roots. Early feminists called for ending practices that 
mostly affected the upper class. In 1899, it is estimated that only ten percent of women 
wore the veil and just .1 percent were secluded.165 Modernity and capitalism, however, 
159 Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 202. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Cole, “Feminism, Class,” 401. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Megahed and Lack, “Colonial Legacy,” 405. 
164 Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 203. 
165 Cole, “Feminism, Class,” 393. 
 30 
                                                 
resulted in an increase in seclusion practices.166 Since new economic opportunities meant 
the family no longer needed female labor in tax-farming or family-run small businesses, 
this rising class could afford the upper-class practices of seclusion and veiling and 
wanted to adopt the traditions.167 With the changing economy also came challenges to 
women’s inheritance; activists sought to guarantee this Koran-specified right.168  
Even as the Egyptian government advocated for more women to join the 
workforce, they did not change personal status laws. This “created an awkward 
dichotomy between [a woman’s] role as citizens of the nation state (watan) and as 
members of the religious community (umma.)”169 Men feared the loss of their own 
masculinity, loss of their culture and way of life, and economic challenges from women. 
Changes to women’s status could potentially threaten men’s status and identity.170 
Although some men embraced opportunities under capitalism, there was an underlying 
fear that there was a larger loss in traditional culture and values taking place.171 
B. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FEMINISM: POST-INDEPENDENCE, 1952 
REVOLUTION, AND PRESIDENT NASSER 
Women’s involvement in the nationalist movement did not result in a cache of 
new opportunities. After independence in 1922, “women had a rude awakening when it 
became clear that liberal men were not prepared to implement their promise to integrate 
women into the public life . . . Feminists became openly militant while most men who 
had been pro-feminist nationalists . . . grew silent as their attention turned [toward] their 
new political careers.”172 Priorities for women’s groups became increasing educational 
opportunities, finding employment options, and changing personal status laws.173 
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Furthermore, after independence, the women’s movement began to split into different 
factions with different notions of what constituted women’s empowerment; however, all 
factions faced difficulties after the 1952 Revolution and the rise of President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser. 
1. Competing factions 
Although Islam was used by all, the women’s movement had two primary 
wings—a secular (nationalist) wing and an Islamist wing.174 Each wing focused on a 
slightly different set of grievances; however, both the secular and Islamist groups based 
their ideas and demands off of Islam. This shows a fundamental difference between the 
concepts of feminism in the West, which is typically divorced from religion, and in 
Egypt.175 Furthermore, the women’s movement gained a socialist and communist wing in 
the 1940s. Adherents of leftist organizations saw women’s liberation as part of a greater 
goal of liberating the poor labor force from capitalism.176  The Islamic feminism 
movement was relatively short lived. After the 1952 revolution, many of the well-known 
women’s groups were banned. President Nasser instigated the demobilization of the 
movement through a mixture of accepting some of the reforms women advocated for and 
then repressing most private organizations, including feminist groups.177 
a. The Secular Faction and the EFU 
Calling one wing of the Islamic feminist movement “secular” is a bit of 
misnomer, since their goals were tied to Islam. Secular feminists tended to focus on 
“revisions of Muslim personal status codes, complementary roles and responsibilities in 
the family, [and] insisting . . . that men honor their duties.”178 They wanted to see greater 
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equality in the public sphere but believed in complementary roles between men and 
women in the private sphere.179  
One of the first women’s groups, the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), was 
created by Huda Sha’rawi in 1923.180 Originally active in the nationalist struggle, 
Sha’rawi mobilized women to protest against the British colonial force.181 The failure of 
the nationalist movement to incorporate women’s demands after taking power directly 
resulted in the founding of the EFU. When, after independence, women were denied 
suffrage and were barred from Parliament, Sha’rawi organized a female demonstration to 
Parliament t to protest.182 Members of the EFU and other secular organizations mostly 
came from wealthy landowning families and had either a European education or access to 
European thoughts and ideas.183 This demographic is exemplified by the first journal 
published by the EFU, L’Egyptienne, being written in French instead of Arabic.184  The 
demographics of the movement would come to be criticized and aid detractors in framing 
the feminists as Western; however, following World War II, the movement eventually 
grew to include some middle class women.185 
b. The Islamist Faction and the MWA 
While both factions in the women’s movement saw Islam as compatible with 
feminism, the fundamentalist wing used only Islam and dismissed other ideologies.186 
One of the main leaders of this branch of the women’s movement was Zaynab al-Ghazali. 
Roxanne Euben and Mohammed Qasim Zaman stated that “if Hasan al-Banna is the 
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father of the contemporary Islamist movement, Zaynab al-Ghazali is perhaps best 
characterized as its largely unsung mother.”187  
Zaynab al-Ghazali founded the Muslim Women’s Association (MWA) when she 
was eighteen after splitting with the EFU. The main reason al-Ghazali left the EFU was 
that she disagreed with their platform that espoused a need for women’s liberation; for al-
Ghazali, women did not need to be liberated because Islamic law gave them all of their 
rights.188 She stated, “[Islam] gave women everything—freedom, economic rights, 
political rights, social rights, public and private rights… Women may talk of liberation in 
Christian society, Jewish society, or pagan society, but in Islamic society it is a grave 
error to speak of the liberation of women.”189 Al-Ghazali advocated for traditional 
gender roles. She believed in equality in religion but complementary public and private 
roles.190 The primary goal of the MWA was to educate women to be knowledgeable of 
all their Islamic rights. It also had various social outreaches such as an orphanage, 
programs to help the poor, services to help the unemployed find work, and counselors to 
mediate marital disputes.191 
2. Political Opportunities 
Women were keen to keep their political contributions to the nationalist cause in 
the minds of the public after independence. They used their past history in the nationalist 
movement as a way to give agency to their cause. By “stressing the close link between 
the beginning of the women’s movement and ‘the nationalist view,’ many activists 
allude[d] to an attitude, in which tahrir al-mar’a (women’s liberation) is part of anti-
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colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.”192 This link to the nationalist movement would 
prove useful in justifying the women’s demands and defending their position against 
claims that women’s rights organizations were Western.193 
The Islamic feminist movement had some success in gaining expanded rights, but 
after the 1952 Revolution, political movements were routinely repressed.194 Women, 
although granted some political rights under the new regime, were not immune to the 
oppression. As Margot Badran explains, “In 1956, the same year that the state granted 
women the right to vote, it paradoxically started to ban feminist organizations and to 
suppress public expression of feminist views, completing its task by 1959.”195 The 
Islamist faction of the movement escaped the first ban, but by 1964 the MWA and the 
Muslim Sisters, the women’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, were banned.196 Like 
many political activists, Zaynab al-Ghazali’s price for her activism was a jail sentence, 
served from 1965–1971.197 In her prison memoirs, al-Ghazali detailed the gruesome 
physical and psychological torture inflicted on her. She survived being beaten multiple 
times, being attacked by dogs, being forced to watch others be tortured in front of her, 
and being submerged in a pool of water for days.198 
3. Employment and Education 
Post-independence, women had some success in gaining educational and 
employment opportunities; however, the most progress came in education and medicine, 
which “were fields in which women professionals typically served the needs of other 
women and thus their new work also perpetuated gender segregation in public space.”199  
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Even though some in the religious community fought against female employment, other 
supported and advocated for it. For example, Zaynab al-Ghazali saw women’s education 
as essential and allowed for some circumstances in which a woman could work outside 
the home and participate in public life. Al-Ghazali believed that marriage and raising a 
family were the primary roles for women;200 however, she saw that the only way that a 
woman could properly raise her children was for that woman to be educated herself in the 
realms of Islam, world politics, culture, and science.201  
Although the 1952 revolution resulted in political repression, it greatly increased 
educational and employment opportunities for women. By the time the 1962 Charter was 
released by the regime, the Egyptian government was focused on growing the economy. 
One way they planned to accomplish this was by increasing the size of their educated 
work force, to include women.202 The 1962 Charter guaranteed equality for all 
Egyptians, male and female, which translated to higher education and a guaranteed job. 
Furthermore, due to state sponsored incentives, women started to study science, math and 
engineering subjects.203 The 1962 Charter, however, inspired a backlash from the 
religious elite. They emphasized women’s traditional roles and believed “that women’s 
economic independence would reduce their need and desire to remain dependent upon 
men.”204  
4. Societal Pressures and Family Law 
While women framed the feminist movement as being based in Islam, they fought 
against detractors who saw the movement as Western. One way women showed their 
commitment to Islam was through the wearing of the hijab. Some female activists felt the 
veil enabled freedom of movement in the public sphere.205 Women in the Islamist 
200 Euben and Zaman, “Chapter 11: Zaynab al-Ghazali,” 279.   
201 Mervat F. Hatem, “Egyptian Discourses on Gender and Political Liberalization: Do Secularist and 
Islamist Views Really Differ?” Middle East Journal 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 673, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328746; Euben and Zaman, “An Islamist Activist,” 285-6.   
202 Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 218. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid., 219. 
205 Badran, Feminism in Islam, 149. 
 36 
                                                 
movements, in particular, stayed dedicated to veiling: “Islamist women insist[ed] upon 
public identification of themselves as committed Muslims, with the hijab or, less 
frequently, the niqab being the most obvious sign of their commitment.”206  
Women had some success working with religious leaders on social issues such as 
limiting alcohol and prostitution, but they faced considerable opposition from those same 
leaders on expanding women’s rights.207 Shortly before the 1952 Revolution, the ulemma 
“held a conference to examine all aspects of women’s status within the context of Islamic 
law . . . [and] attacked the feminist movement, claiming it was influenced and supported 
by British imperialists, and saying that ‘colonialism had encouraged women to go out in 
order to destroy Islamic society.’”208 The women’s movement’s greatest challenge was 
changing personal status laws. Given public opinion and the risk of backlash from the 
religious authorities, political leaders initially felt they did not have the power to make 
drastic changes.209  
C. PRESIDENTS SADAT AND MUBARAK 
President Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, made changes that affected all of 
Egyptian society. He embraced “open door” capitalism and rising religious fervor.210 
Women experienced an increase in economic opportunities under Sadat and his 
successor, Hosni Mubarak, but they also faced inconsistency in personal status laws and 
political freedoms. 
Religious fundamentalism and outward expressions initially increased under 
Sadat. The 1970s saw a rise in veiling among women. Islamic groups became popular 
among poor and middle class female university students, especially those studying 
medicine and science.211 Women turned towards Islamist organizations because they felt 
206 Badran, Feminism in Islam, 145. 
207 Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 208-9. 
208 Ibid., 214. 
209 Ibid., 211. 
210 Ibid., 222. 
211 Ibid., 223. 
 37 
                                                 
undervalued and felt they lacked other options.212 When Egypt succeeded in the 1973 
war, religious fundamentalist leaders felt vindicated; they saw the victory as a reward for 
the Egyptian people returning to Islam. Even so, Sadat had a mixed relationship with 
Islamic groups throughout his regime, and a Muslim fundamentalist eventually 
assassinated him.213 
President Hosni Mubarak also had a mixed record with Islamist groups. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, repressed periodically since its inception, began to gain traction in 
Parliament.214 In the 2005 legislative election, the Muslim Brotherhood won its highest 
percentage of the vote ever, with Brotherhood candidates—running as independents—
taking 88 of the 454 seats.215 Mubarak reacted harshly and detained hundreds of Muslim 
Brotherhood members and changed the constitution in order to prevent another Muslim 
Brotherhood electoral victory.216 
1. Education and Employment 
The one aspect of women’s empowerment that Egyptian regimes and Muslim 
religious leaders seemed to agree was education; “Islamists have not produced a backlash 
against female education due to the fact that Islam stresses education, including religious 
education, for both men and women.”217 Furthermore, Brandt and Kaplan state, “Islamist 
groups . . . while confronting the government, rely upon educated, activist women as part 
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of their movements.”218 Female primary and secondary school enrollment increased from 
88 percent to 90 percent from 2002 to 2005.219  
Economic policy changes affected education. Instead of focusing the economy on 
state businesses and guaranteeing all citizens employment, the Sadat regime opened 
Egypt to foreign investment and promoted private business. With the loss of guaranteed 
jobs, women were encouraged to stay out of the work force in order to not compete with 
men.220 Even so, economic opportunities in the Gulf region increased, and men 
eventually sought work in the Gulf reopening the Egyptian labor market to women. The 
rise in the wear of the veil can be linked to this change; it “has been connected in part 
with women’s need to work and their wish at the same time to protect themselves from 
exposure to male harassment. This security however is sought at the price of engaging in 
passive rather than active resistance to male intimidation.”221  
Economic policy under Mubarak further affected women’s employment. Studies 
in Cairo in the 1980s and 1990s showed that “as private sector wages have far outstripped 
public sector salaries, boys are tending to leave school earlier in [favor] of private sector 
employment or vocational training, leaving more family income for girls to continue their 
schooling and aspire to [lower paid] government positions.”222  Furthermore, males that 
immigrated to the Gulf brought back higher wages then what women could earn in Egypt. 
Although more women were working, their husbands’ higher salaries reinforced that they 
were not meant to be the primary wage earners: women’s work was considered help 
instead of actual work.223  
Although literacy rates and educational enrollment increased under President 
Mubarak, a gender gap existed between men and women. In 2005, while men’s illiteracy 
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rate was 18.3 percent, women’s was 43.8 percent.224 Furthermore, women were not 
enrolling in science and engineering fields of study. In 2006–2007, women made up 28 
percent of the engineering students, but they constituted 73 percent of art students.225 
Employment opportunities still lacked as well. In 2008, 20 percent of women were 
unemployed in comparison to six percent of men.226  
2. Political Opportunities, Family Law, and Societal Position  
The Sadat and Mubarak regimes increased political opportunities for women. The 
Sadat regime enacted a law requiring 30 seats in Parliament to go to women.227 President 
Mubarak also appointed the first female judge in 2003.228 The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
increased prominence, however, raised concerns for female political opportunities. In 
2007, the Brotherhood published a party program outlining political changes it wished to 
see eventually enacted.229 The program deemed women, as well as the Coptic Christian 
minority, ineligible to be the head of the state.230 Furthermore, women were “placed . . . 
under a special section entitled ‘Issues and Problems.’”231 
President Sadat and President Mubarak made changes for and against women in 
terms of family law. In a vein similar to Sadat’s early years, Mubarak sought to gain 
favor from the religious elite with these changes. In many ways, Islam’s last place to hold 
control was family law: “Islam, in modern Egypt, has been controlled by the state. The 
Islamic establishment has had to negotiate with and accommodate to the secular state. 
The last bastion of official Islam has been the regulation of family life.”232  
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Sadat’s regime initially supported religious fundamentalist positions as a way to 
appease politically powerful religious leaders. For example, the 1971 Constitution 
dictated a difference in a woman’s public and private roles.233 Sadat would later change 
his position toward women’s reforms. In 1979, by Presidential decree, President Sadat 
implemented changes in personal status laws that gave women more rights in family law 
matters. President Mubarak repealed the law in 1985 under pressure from Islamists.234 
This led, however, to a feminist collective action that resulted in a law being passed that 
restored the majority of the 1979 decree.235 Mubarak granted further rights in 2005; 
women were granted expanded divorce rights, but a call for easing of restrictions on 
travel was unsuccessful.236 
D. SINCE THE ARAB SPRING IN 2011 
In the last four years Egypt has seen a great amount of turmoil and a rise in 
women’s activism. Women played an integral role in managing the logistics of the Arab 
Spring movement in Tahrir Square.237 President Mubarak’s overthrow in February 
2011,238 however, did not translate into an increase in rights for women.  
After Mubarak’s fall, there was a period of transition that ended with Mohammed 
Morsi, a politician from the Muslim Brotherhood, being democratically elected in 
2012.239 By May 2013, the majority of Egyptians had lost hope and did not agree with 
the Muslim Brotherhood-run government’s policies and actions.240 In July 2013, 
although democratically elected, the Morsi presidency faced serious public opposition 
and demonstrations. The Egyptian army disposed of Morsi and quickly installed a 
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civilian head of government to avoid the appearance of a coup. Even though the new 
president, Adly Mansour, “vowed to include all sections of society, including Islamists, 
in an interim coalition government,” the Army issued arrest warrants for leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.241 A year later, former field marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi was 
elected.242 Throughout the turmoil, women faced various challenges. 
After the 2011 revolution, the military council took steps that decreased political 
opportunities for women, and the Muslim Brotherhood-run government’s actions further 
concerned feminist activists. Under Mubarak there had been a quota guaranteeing women 
a percentage of seats in Parliament. Although the ruling party had used the seats as a 
form a patronage, the cancellation of the quota drastically decreased the number of 
female lawmakers.243 In the 2012 election, “female candidates won only about 1 percent 
of the seats . . . and some of the conservative Islamist parties that [gained political 
agency] support gender segregation and emphasize that women’s primary role should be 
as homemakers.”244 When Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood took power 
in 2012, they drafted and passed a new constitution.245 Concern for the rights of women 
plagued the constitution from the start. In July 2013, after Morsi’s overthrow, the military 
suspended the constitution.246 
The Arab Spring did not slow down the increase in women’s enrollment in higher 
education, but education does not necessarily reflect gains in other aspects of life. As of 
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2012, 56 percent of university students were women.247 Although there were a large 
number of women attending universities, there were very few female faculty members, 
and female-focused subject areas were still rare.248 Furthermore, women continued to 
gravitate toward literature and social sciences instead of science and technology for fields 
of study; these subject areas continue to offer fewer employment opportunities.249 
Furthermore, women still are pressured to forgo a career for marriage.250  
E. CONCLUSION 
Although Egypt was the birthplace of the original Islamic feminist movement in 
the early twentieth century, its record on women’s rights and freedoms in civil society is 
mixed. While secular and Islamist leaders tended to promote education, they clashed over 
women’s rights to employment and possible changes in personal status laws. The Islamic 
frame of various women’s movements as well as women’s activism during the nationalist 
movement and the Arab Spring has granted women some agency in Egypt. Even so, 
women face an uphill battle against the patriarchal society, even if the government is 
devoid of Islamist politics, in order to become full members of the civil society.  
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IV. IMPORTANCE OF ISLAMISM AND A WOMAN’S ROLE: 
STATISTICS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
This chapter reviews Islamism and women’s roles in Turkey and Egypt by 
focusing on select variables over the past 30 years. The rate of Islamism is measured in 
terms of electoral results and popular sentiment, while variables for women’s role include 
political participation, educational opportunities, and employment data.  
A. MEASURING ISLAMISM 
This study measures rates of Islamism by reviewing electoral success and public 
opinion. 
1. Elections 
The electoral success of political Islamist parties is one indicator of rising rates of 
Islamism. Electoral success, however, cannot be seen as the sole measure of Islamist 
popularity due to previous and current (in the case of Egypt) restrictions on religious 
parties in Turkey and Egypt.251 Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of the vote won by 
Islamist parties over the past 22 years. Islamist parties in Turkey include precursor parties 
to the AK Party. For Egypt, the Islamist vote includes the Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, as well as Salafist parties and Muslim Brotherhood 
members that ran as independents in order to circumvent election laws.252  
Figure 1 illustrates that while the AKP has steadily increased their percentage of 
the popular vote, they have lost some of their seats in Parliament. However, they still 
maintain a majority and currently run the Turkish government.253 Table 1 illustrates that 
251 “Republic of Turkey,” Election Guide: Democracy Assistance & Elections News, International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, accessed February 20, 2015, 
http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/218/; “Arab Republic of Egypt,” Election Guide: Democracy 
Assistance & Elections News, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, accessed February 20, 2015, 
http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/65/. 
252 Ibid. 
253 “Republic of Turkey.”   
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while more Turks feel that religion has a large role in politics since the AK Party gained 
control, a significant portion of the population disagrees with that statement.254 
Figure 2 displays the percentage of seats Islamists won in elections for the 
Egyptian People’s Assembly since 2005 and the Advisory Council since 2011. The 2010 
People’s Assembly election was boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood after early rounds 
of voting.255 
 
Figure 1.  Turkish Elections—Islamist Percentage256 
254 “Chapter 2. Muslim Opinion on Government and Social Issues,” Pew Research Center, last 
modified on June 3, 2003, http://www.pewglobal.org/2003/06/03/chapter-2-muslim-opinion-on-
government-and-social-issues/; Nicole Speulda and Mary McIntosh, “Global Gender Gaps,” Pew Research 
Center, last modified May 13, 2004, http://www.people-press.org/2004/05/13/global-gender-gaps-2; 
“Chapter 3. Role of Islam in Politics,” Pew Research Center, last modified July 10, 2012, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/chapter-3-role-of-islam-in-politics;  Richard C. Auxier, “Egypt, 
Democracy, and Islam,” Pew Research Center, last modified January 31, 2011, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/2011/01/31/egypt-democracy-and-islam/. 
255 Amro Hassan, “Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood to Boycott Parliamentary Elections Runoff,” Babylon 
& Beyond Blog, December 1, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/12/egypt-
muslim-brotherhood-to-boycott-parliamentary-elections-run-off.html; 
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Table 1.   Turkish Opinion on the Role of Islam in Politics257 
What is the Role of Islam in Political 
Life? 2003 2004 2005 2010 2012 




Figure 2.  Egyptian Elections—Islamists Percentage258 
The data in Figure 2 does not illustrate the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity after the 
2013 military takeover.259 The Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity decreased since the 
2011 uprising, as shown by Figure 3. Although support for the Muslim Brotherhood was 
high after the 2011 Arab Spring Protests, it has since declined dramatically and now more 
Egyptians have an unfavorable view of the organization than a favorable one.260 
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Din, “Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Legislative Life Begins Amid Tension and Divisions,” Ahram Online, January 
23, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/100/32384/Elections-/News/Egypts-postMubarak-
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Figure 3.  Egyptian Views of the Muslim Brotherhood261 
2. Public Opinion 
The growth of Islamism can be measured using other variables. One is public 
opinion concerning the importance of religion for the everyday person. As illustrated by 
Figures 4 and 5, over 80 percent of Turks and 90 percent of Egyptians value religion as 
very or rather important. The survey this data was extrapolated from, however, did not 
specify what religion was important.262 Although Egypt and Turkey are majority Muslim 
countries, they do have religious minorities.  
261 “Chapter 2. Egyptian Views of Leaders.” 
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Figure 4.  Importance of Religion in Turkey263 
 
Figure 5.  Importance of Religion in Egypt264 
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Feeling that religion is personally important does not necessarily translate to 
feeling that religion should have a central role in public life. For example, not all 
Egyptians and Turks feel Sharia law should be central to their legal systems.265 A 2012 
survey by the Pew Research center showed that while only 12 percent of Turkish 
respondents favored making sharia law the official law, 74 percent of Egyptians favored 
it.266 The Egyptian opinion, however, has changed since the military takeover in 2013. 
As shown by Table 2, the majority of Egyptians now do not agree that laws should 
strictly follow the Koran. (The difference in the two surveys for 2012 in Egypt can be 
attributed to different interpretations of “Sharia Law” and “Laws that Strictly Follow the 
Koran.”) 
Table 2.   Egyptian Opinion on the Role of the Koran in Law267 
Should laws strictly follow the 
Quran? 2011 2012 2013 2014 
yes 62% 60% 58% 48% 
 
B. WOMEN’S ROLE IN CIVIL SOCIETY 
For the purpose of this study, women’s role in civil society is going to be 
measured through political, educational, and employment opportunities.  
1. Political Opportunity and Parliamentary Representation 
As discussed in Chapters II and III, political opportunities for women in Egypt 
and Turkey have been inconsistent. Women gained the right to vote and hold office in 
264 Ibid. 
265 “Chapter 2. Muslim Opinion on Government”; Speulda and McIntosh.  “Global Gender Gaps”;  
“Chapter 1. Beliefs About Sharia,” Pew Research Center, last modified April 30, 2013, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/; 
“Chapter 3. Role of Islam in Politics”; Auxier, “Egypt, Democracy, and Islam”; “Chapter 3. Democratic 
Values in Egypt,” Pew Research Center, last modified May 22, 2014, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/05/22/chapter-3-democratic-values-in-egypt. 
266 “Chapter 1. Beliefs About Sharia.” 
267 “Chapter 3. Democratic Values in Egypt.” 
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Turkey in 1934; however, forming independent political groups was difficult.268  While 
the proportion of women in Turkish Parliament increased from one percent to 14.4 
percent (as shown by Figure 6) over the past 20 years, Table 3 shows that public opinion 
still holds that men make better leaders than women. Furthermore, the proportion of 
women in Parliament, at 14.4 percent, is considerably smaller than the proportion of 
women in the entire population, which is 50.9 percent.269 
 
Figure 6.  Women in Parliament270 
Table 3.   Opinion—Gender and Political Leadership271 
 
Turkey Egypt 
Who makes better political 
leaders? 2007 2012 2007 2013 
men 34% 52% 38% 42% 
women 10%   15%   
equal 51%   43%   
268 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 177, 180; Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 23, 41.  
269 “Chapter 5. Views on Gender Issues,” Pew Research Center, last modified October 4, 2007, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/10/04/chapter-5-views-on-gender-issues/;  “Chapter 4. Gender Equality,” 
Pew Research Center, last modified July 10, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/chapter-4-
gender-equality/; “World DataBank,” The World Bank, accessed February 20, 2015, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. 
270 “World DataBank.” 

















                                                 
Egyptian women have faced similar circumstances as their Turkish counterparts. 
As discussed in Chapter III, while women gained the right to vote in 1956, most 
independent women’s groups were banned by 1959.272 As shown by Figure 6, the 
proportion of women in the Egyptian Parliament has held steady at about two percent 
since the 1990s, with the exception of 2010. The proportion of women in the Egyptian 
Parliament dropped from 12 percent to two percent after the 2011 uprising. As discussed 
in Chapter III, the Mubarak regime enacted a quota guaranteeing women a certain 
number of seats. After the Revolution, the quota was abolished.273 As far as public 
opinion, the percentage of respondents to a Pew Survey believing men make better 
leaders than women increased between 2007 and 2012. As shown in Table 3, while the 
number of respondents that believe men are better leaders increased, it is still below 50 
percent.274 
2. Education: Literacy and Enrollment 
Women have become more educated in Egypt and Turkey over the past forty 
years.275 Literacy rates as well as rates of educational enrollment and completion have 
increased in both countries. This increase reflects the importance of education held by the 
population as reflected in public opinion polls.276  
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate how primary and tertiary enrollment for women has 
increased since the 1970s. As a result, literacy rates have risen for young women (as 
shown in Figure 7).277  
272 Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 217. 
273 Bar’el, “For Egypt’s Women.” 
274 “Chapter 5. Views on Gender Issues”; “Chapter 4. Gender Equality.” 
275 “World DataBank.” 
276 “World DataBank”; “Chapter 5. Views on Gender Issues”; “Online Data Analysis.” 
277 “World DataBank.” 
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Figure 7.  Literacy Rates278 
 
Figure 8.  Educational Enrollment—Turkey279 
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Figure 9.  Educational Enrollment—Egypt280 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate how women now outnumber men in the primary 
education systems. In 1971, there was approximately one woman per every five men in 
tertiary education in Turkey. By 2012 that number had risen to eight and a half women 
per every ten men. For primary education, in 2012, girls enrolled in greater numbers than 
boys. There were 10.2 girls for every ten boys.281 Similar trends occurred in Egypt. 
Tertiary enrollment increased from slightly less than four women for every 10 men to 
over nine women per ten men. As of 2012, girls enrolled and completed primary school 
in higher numbers than boys in Egypt.282 
Public opinion supports granting women and girls opportunities for education. 
Over the past ten years, surveys reported that Turkish public opinion felt that educating 
girls was as important as educating boys. In 2001, over 96 percent of those surveyed felt 
that educating women was somewhat to very important, and a 2007 survey showed that 
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86 percent of respondents felt that educating women was of equal importance to 
educating men. The World Value Survey from 2010–2014 showed that over 65 percent of 
Turkish respondents disagreed that it was more important for a boy to receive a university 
education than a woman.283 While not as high, a 2001 survey showed Egyptian 
respondents agreeing that it was somewhat to very important to educated girls. 
Furthermore, a 2007 survey showed that 73 percent of Egyptian respondents believed that 
educating girls was equal in importance to educating boys. The World Value 2010–2014 
Survey results were similar for Egypt and Turkey: 63 percent of Egyptians disagreed that 
it was more important for boys to receive a university education.284 
3. Women in the Workforce 
Chapters II and III briefly reviewed initiatives aimed at getting women to work 
outside the home, and some of the obstacles women have faced. These chapters 
concluded that government policies and public opinion did not always align. While the 
governments of Turkey and Egypt tried to get women to join the workforce for economic 
reasons, some men feared that women joining the workforce would result in greater 
competition for scarce jobs or feared that it was harbinger of cultural decay.285 This 
chapter focuses on employment statistics and recent public opinion polls. 
Public opinion polls conducted over the past 15 years show support for women 
working outside the home but reflect the attitude that men should have priority for 
jobs.286 Surveys in Turkey show that the majority of Turkish respondents (over 85 
percent) believe that women have the right to work outside the home. However, the 
percentage dropped from 95 percent to 86 percent between 2010 and 2013. In contrast, 
the same surveys in Egypt resulted in a slimmer but more stable majority—61 percent in 
283 “Chapter 5. Views on Gender Issues”; “Online Data Analysis.” 
284 Ibid. 
285 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 30; Al-Ali, Secularism, 45; Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 218-9. 
286 “Gender Equality Universally Embraced, But Inequalities Acknowledged,” Pew Research Center, 
last modified July 1, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/01/gender-equality; “Chapter 4. Gender 
Equality”; “Online Data Analysis.” 
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2010 and 2013—of respondents believe women can work outside the home.287 Table 4 
illustrates that Turkish and Egyptian opinion is that men should have priority for scarce 
jobs. 
Table 4.   Opinion—Gender and Access to Jobs288 








Turkey-Agree 59.3% 52.1% 59.4% 
Turkey-Disagree 28.4% 29.2% 23.1% 
Egypt-Agree 89.6% 89.0% 83.4% 
Egypt-Disagree 0.4% 4.3% 11.0% 
 
Figure 10 displays female labor figures for Turkey over the past 15 years. While the 
participation rate has averaged slightly less than 30 percent, there was a small dip in 
participation from 2000 to 2008. Meanwhile, the percentage of women’s jobs that are 
vulnerable has decreased steadily since the late 1990s.289 Figure 11 illustrates that the 
trend in unemployment for women has followed the overall trend for unemployment in 
Turkey.290 
287 “Gender Equality Universally Embraced”; “Chapter 4. Gender Equality.” 
288 “Online Data Analysis.” 
289 “World DataBank.” 
290 Ibid. 
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Figure 10.  Female Labor Percentages—Turkey291 
 
 
Figure 11.  Unemployment—Turkey292 
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Egypt, as shown in Figure 12, has different patterns for employment. As reported by the 
World Bank, unemployment has averaged around ten percent since 1992. Women’s 
unemployment, however, has averaged 40 percent.293 Data similar to what is displayed in 
Figure 10 was not readily available for Egypt. 
 
Figure 12.  Unemployment—Egypt294 
4. What About the Veil? 
One issue of social standing that receives attention in the West is veiling. Table 5 
illustrates that majorities in both Egypt and Turkey feel that women have a choice in 
whether or not they veil. In 2013, the percentage of Egyptians who agreed with that 
sentiment decreased to 46 percent: the Pew survey was concluded prior to the 2013 
military takeover. The survey did not discuss the reasons for the decrease, so it cannot be 
ascertained if it was because of increased Islamism or because of a rejection of Islamism 
following the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood.295 
293 “World DataBank.” 
294 Ibid. 
295 “Chapter 5. Views on Gender Issues”; “Chapter 4: Women In Society,” Pew Research Center, last 
modified April 30, 2013, http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-
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Table 5.   Public Opinion on the Veil296 
Women can choose to veil or not 
(%) 2007 2010 2013 
Egypt-agree 60% 51% 46% 
Egypt-disagree 33% 48% 
 Turkey-agree 93% 96% 90% 
Turkey-disagree 5% 3% 
  
C. CORRELATION VERSUS CAUSATION 
Figure 13 displays how in Turkey the rise in the power of the political Islamism 
correlates minimally to an increase in the percentage of parliamentary seats held by 
women, as well as increased literacy; it also correlates to increased unemployment for 
women.297 As discussed in section B.3, however, the increase in women’s unemployment 
followed the national unemployment trends.298  
Figure 14 illustrates similar data for Egypt that is illustrated in Figure 13 for 
Turkey. Although a correlation is shown between rising Islamist political success and the 
rise in the number of women in Parliament and increased literacy rates in Turkey, the 
correlation does not hold in Egypt.299 Egyptian electoral laws and the boycott of the 2010 
election by the Muslim Brotherhood make measuring Islamist sentiment through the 
variable of electoral success difficult. Furthermore, the increase in female representation 
in the People’s Assembly in 2010 was due to an election quota.300  
296 “Chapter 5. Views on Gender Issues”; “Chapter 4: Women In Society”; Pew Research Center,  
“Gender Equality Universally Embraced.” 
297 “World DataBank”; “Republic of Turkey.” 
298 “World DataBank.” 
299 “World DataBank”; “Arab Republic of Egypt”; Hassan, “Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood to Boycott”; 
Essam El-Din, “Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Legislative.” 
300 Hassan, “Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood to boycott”; Bar’el, “For Egypt’s women.” 
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Figure 13.  Turkey—Islamist Political Gains versus Women’s Opportunities301 
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While increased Islamist political success correlated to some increased 
opportunities for women in Turkey, it is not possible to conclude with this data that the 
increase in Islamism caused the increase in opportunities. As discussed in Chapters II and 
III, other factors besides religion have influenced women’s place in civil society. Figures 
15 and 16 illustrate how in both Turkey in Egypt over the past 25 years, access to 
communication and clean water has greatly increased. One might conclude that these 
factors could also influence the increase in female education shown in Figures 8 and 9.   
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Figure 15.  Other Factors—Access to Water303 
 
Figure 16.  Other Factors—Cell Phone and Internet Usage304 
303 T.R. Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, Millennium Development 
Goals Report: Turkey 2005, United Nations Development Programme, accessed February 21, 2015,  56, 
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y_MDGReport_2005.pdf; T.R. Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, 
Millennium Development Goals Report: Turkey 2010, United Nations Development Programme, accessed 
February 21, 2015,  52, 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country%20Reports/Turkey/Mille
nnium_Development_Goals_Report_2010___Turkey___English.pdf; Ministry of Economic Development, 
Egypt: Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, United Nations Development Programme, accessed 
February 21, 2015, 54, 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The data discussed in this chapter shows a correlation between increased political 
Islam in Turkey and increased political and educational opportunities for women. Egypt 
does not mirror this, and due to past electoral laws and current sentiment towards the 
Muslim Brotherhood it is difficult to conclude how much Islamism affects women. 
Furthermore, although the data shows a correlation between increased Islamism and 
education, the variables used in this study are too narrow to conclude that increased 
Islamism causes increased educational opportunities. 
  
304 T.R. Prime Ministry, Millennium Development Goals Report: Turkey 2005, 69; T.R. Prime 
Ministry, Millennium Development Goals Report: Turkey 2010, 60-61; Ministry of Economic 
Development, Egypt’s Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (2010), United 
Nations Development Programme, accessed February 21, 2015, 130, 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country%20Reports/Egypt/2010%
20MDGR_English_R5.pdf; Ministry of Economic Development, Egypt: Achieving, 63. 
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This study investigated a potential connection between rising Islamism and the 
role of women in civil society. Quantifying religious sentiment and how it affects women 
is difficult, and the conclusion of this study is that the two main variables are too broad to 
definitively conclude a correlation. Increased Islamism correlates to some increased 
rights for women, but it is impossible to establish causation between rising Islamism and 
greater rights. Simultaneously, increased Islamism results in decreased rights in other 
aspects of life. 
Chapter II looked at Turkey through a review of current scholarly work, and 
concluded that the place of women in civil society is tied to multiple factors. While calls 
for reform have come from secular and religious political organizations, usually they 
were the result of other motivations besides women’s rights. Educational and 
employment opportunities steadily increased due to a desire to modernize the economy. 
Political opportunities had more to do with the openness of the government to any 
independent political organizations than to gender. Family law and personal status were 
more complex. Despite religious opposition, the secular policies enacted by Ataturk’s 
government resulted in increased rights for women. In contrast, the lifting of the ban on 
the headscarf by the AK Party can also be seen as an increase in women’s personal rights.  
 Current scholarly work on Egypt, which was reviewed in Chapter III, concluded 
that entrenched patriarchy, which in some cases was tied to religious sentiment and in 
others was not, was the greatest challenge for women. Similar to Turkey, governments 
and religious leaders supported education. Although governments supported female 
employment as an economic necessity, women faced a challenging environment finding 
work that was considered equal in importance to men’s. Furthermore, similar to the 
situation in Turkey, changes to personal status laws faced religious backlash. While 
Turkey was able to change codes in 1926,305 Egyptian women had to wait until 1979 for 
305 Kandiyoti, “End of Empire,” 22-3. 
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large-scale changes.306 Even then, the codes were changed back under President 
Mubarak, and as of 2005, women were still working toward equal personal status 
rights.307 
 Chapter IV echoes the conclusions of Chapters II and III. Data illustrates that 
women have gained more educational and employment opportunities in Turkey over the 
last 30 years. In Egypt, while women have also gained more educational opportunities, 
the employment data shows inequality between men and women. Parliamentary 
participation increased for women in Turkey; however, making conclusions on political 
electoral results is difficult for both countries due to past laws outlawing religious 
political parties and mandating parliamentary seats to women. Although the data shows a 
weak but measurable correlation between rising Islamism and rising educational 
opportunities, the variables are too narrow to conclude there is causation. As discussed by 
Chapters II and III, other factors affect women’s access to employment. 
 Overall, there is a correlation between Islamism and increased education, but not 
other factors. Reviewing the potential hypotheses set forth in Chapter I, this study 
concludes that validity of the hypothesis is dependent on the variable of women’s status 
that is studied. H1, that there is no correlation between Islamism and opportunities for 
women, appears true for employment and political opportunities. Meanwhile, H2—there 
is a correlation between increased political Islam and increased female opportunity—is 
true for education, and H3—political Islam correlates to less opportunities for women—is 
true for personal status laws. Furthermore, although there are some similarities between 
Egypt and Turkey, this study, in particular Chapter IV, illustrates how these countries are 
dissimilar.  
This thesis does not definitively state whether rising political Islam positively or 
negatively impacts women. It does, however, show that the role of women is a complex 
issue that can be looked at through multiple elements that are affected by many different 
variables. From a policy perspective, this study shows that the Muslim world is not 
306 Badran, “Competing Agendas,” 224-5. 
307 Megahed and Lack, “Colonial legacy,” 407. 
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monolithic, and there is not an overwhelming correlation between Islamist societal 
tendencies and a disempowered position for women in society. A women’s role in society 
is complex in any country, and that, as well as women’s desires, need to be taken into 
account when implementing policy aimed at making their lives better. 
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